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1  | INTRODUC TION
Much extant commentary on whistleblowing follows any of four main 
approaches (which are not mutually exclusive): experiential surveys, 
psychological studies, legal studies, and ethical studies. The first ap-
proach reports on the individualized experience of whistleblowing; 
it focuses on how individuals decide to raise an issue, how organiza-
tions respond, how individuals suffer retaliation, and so forth (e.g., 
Dewing & Russell, 2014; Glazer & Glazer, 1989; Miceli & Near, 1992; 
Park, Blenkinsopp, Oktem, & Omurgonulsen, 2008; Park, Bjørkelo, & 
Blekinsopp, 2018). The second approach identifies psychological and 
situational variables which make individuals more or less likely to be-
come whistleblowers (e.g., Anvari, Wenzel, Woodyatt, & Alexander 
Haslam, 2019; Bjørkelo, Einarsen, & Mathiesen, 2010; Hess, Treviño, 
Chen, & Cross, 2019; Mesmer-Magnus & Chockalingam, 2005; Park 
& Lewis 2019; Sims & Keenan, 1998). The third approach studies 
the forms of and justifications for laws intended to encourage whis-
tleblowers and protect them from retaliation (e.g., Ashton, 2015; 
Callahan, Dworkin, & Lewis, 2004; Lewis, Bowers, Fodder, & 
Mitchell, 2017; Lewis, 2018; Savage, 2016; Vaughn, 2012). The 
fourth approach considers ethical arguments for and against whis-
tleblowing, evaluating competing moral imperatives such as altru-
ism, honesty, loyalty, confidentiality, and deference (e.g., Boot, 2019; 
Ceva & Bocchiola, 2020; Grant, 2002; Hoffman & Schwartz 2015; 
Kumar & Santoro, 2017; Larmer, 1992; O’Sullivan & Ngau, 2014; 
Vandekerckhove & Commers, 2004). The present article offers a 
fifth approach: it seeks to clarify the power relations which whis-
tleblowing involves, while largely abstracting from individual expe-
riences, psychological characteristics, legal constraints, and ethical 
principles.
Specifically, this article presents a network perspective on whis-
tleblowing and power. In the human relations context of this article, 
power means the ability to effect change through the agency of oth-
ers; that is, the ability to influence others and to get things done.1 
Power is conceived as deriving from the positions of persons (whom 
I shall refer to as “actors”) within a network. That is, the power of 
each of the relevant actors—whistleblower, victim, wrongdoer, and a 
person to whom the whistle is blown—depends on the configuration 
of the networks between and around them. The study of networks 
usually focuses on unstructured networks, where power is wholly 
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This article presents a network perspective on whistleblowing. It considers how 
whistleblowing affects, and is affected by, the preexisting distribution of power in-
side and outside an organization, where power is conceptualized as deriving from 
the network positions of the key actors. The article also highlights four characteristic 
features of whistleblowing: third-party detriment, local subversion, appeal to cen-
tral or external power, and reasonable expectation of concern. The feature of local 
subversion succinctly explains why whistleblowing is difficult. The feature of appeal 
to central or external power highlights that contrary to the perception of a democra-
tizing phenomenon, whistleblowing tends to redistribute discretion away from local 
power toward more central power. This suggests a need for caution about institu-
tional measures to promote whistleblowing in contexts where governance is already 
highly centralized.
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emergent; on the contrary, whistleblowing normally occurs in hier-
archical networks, where power is partly designed and partly emer-
gent. Nevertheless, concepts such as range, degree, and centrality, 
which are typically used to describe unstructured networks, can also 
be adapted to describe certain properties of hierarchies.
This article differs from the four long-established approaches 
outlined above in that it focuses on power relations. There is a more 
recent whistleblowing literature which also focuses on power re-
lations, albeit with different analytical constructs to the network 
concepts in this article. One strand interprets whistleblowing as a 
manifestation of Foucault's interpretation of the ancient Greek con-
cept of parrhesia or “fearless speech,” whereby the whistleblower 
is viewed as a political actor whose sense of self depends on speak-
ing the truth to more powerful persons (e.g., Mansbach, 2011; 
Vandekerckhove & Langenberg, 2012; Weiskopf & Tobias-Miersch, 
2016). Conventional attitudes to whistleblowers are often am-
bivalent, insofar as they viewed as both heroes and traitors (e.g., 
Davis, 1989; Grant, 2002; Hersh, 2002; Rothschild & Miethe, 1999); 
the reinterpretation of whistleblowing as parrhesia, understood as 
both an ethical practice and an identity position, offers an alterna-
tive to this confusion (Kenny, 2019, pp. 28–29). Other recent per-
spectives on whistleblowing and power include power conceived as 
an organizational matrix of control that operates by regulating the 
intelligibility of speech, and so acts to delegitimize and exclude the 
“impossible” speech of whistleblowers (Kenny, 2018); power deriv-
ing from organizations’ discretion over the timeline for investigating 
and responding to whistleblowing complaints (Kenny, 2015); and 
the power of organizational and professional norms to continue to 
shape whistleblowers’ subjectivities even after they have been os-
tracized by those organizations and professions (Kenny, Fotaki, & 
Vandekerckhove, 2019).
Perhaps the closest earlier work to this article, at least in terms 
of area of inquiry, is King (1999) who discusses The implications of an 
organization's structure on whistleblowing. He describes five organi-
zational structures (centralized, matrix, horizontal, hybrid, and divi-
sional), and makes observations such as “in large organizations, due 
to the number of sequential links, it is more difficult for managers to 
make members aware of established [whistleblowing] channels”; and 
“open communication between a superior and subordinate could al-
leviate the potential for external whistleblowing” (King, 1999, p. 324); 
but he makes no explicit reference to network concepts. Another 
strand of literature, not specifically concerned with whistleblowing, 
highlights that power derived from network structure can either 
reinforce or counteract hegemonic power. On the one hand, ac-
tors with hegemonic power often also have high network central-
ity, which might enable them to reinforce their hegemonic power 
by surveillance of many actors (e.g., Brass, Gaaskiewicz, Greve, & 
Tsai, 2004; Lyon, 1994; Munro, 2000); on the other hand, the emer-
gence of networks among more peripheral actors might enable resis-
tance to hegemonic power (eg Castells, 2012; Munro, 2016, 2017). 
Other authors have studied the effect of network structure on un-
ethical behavior and corruption in organizations. Brass, Butterfield, 
and Skaggs (1998) note, for example, that where individual A is 
connected to each of B and C, but B and C are not connected to 
each other, this “structural hole” in the network may facilitate un-
ethical behavior by A toward either of B or C. Similarly, Ferrali (2018) 
predicts that the incidence of corruption will be higher in isolated 
enclaves, that is subgroups of a network whose members have many 
connections within the subgroup, but few connections outside the 
subgroup. The contribution of the present article is to make some 
analogous observations about the effects of network structure on 
whistleblowing.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. I first clarify the 
nature of whistleblowing with a network model which identifies the 
four actors common to any whistleblowing situation, the configu-
ration of the relations between them, and some characteristic fea-
tures of those relations. I show how the properties of the hierarchy 
in which the actors are situated can be characterized by concepts 
such as the range and strictness of the hierarchy as a whole, and the 
degree, centrality, and span of control of individual actors. I then dis-
cuss how these properties may affect the incidence and outcomes of 
whistleblowing. Finally, I stress that the network perspective is of-
fered as a complement rather than a substitute to other approaches 
to the study of whistleblowing.
2  | A NET WORK PERSPEC TIVE ON 
WHISTLEBLOWING
A widely cited definition of whistleblowing is as follows:
the disclosure by organization members (former or current) 
of illegal, immoral or illegitimate practices under the con-
trol of their employers, to persons or organizations that 
may be able to effect action (Near and Miceli (1985))
While a definition of this nature is adequate for many purposes, it 
glosses over the distinctive power relations which whistleblowing in-
volves. Taken at face value, the above definition makes no distinction 
between the disclosure of misconduct perpetrated by one's boss, by 
subordinates, or by peers; but each of these involves very different 
power relations, and often different moral valences. This vagueness 
about power relations tends to obscure the essentially subversive 
character of whistleblowing. A main point of this article is to high-
light that whistleblowing always involves a challenge to a person with 
local power, that is, it involves local subversion. This feature is worth 
emphasizing because it is the most succinct explanation of why whis-
tleblowing is difficult, why whistleblowers encounter resistance, and 
why they are often badly treated even when they are clearly right. To 
appreciate this feature more fully, it helps to think about the power 
relations which whistleblowing involves in a structural way, as in the 
following model.
The model involves four actors (nodes in a network) and three ac-
tions (relations or flows between the nodes). The actors are: (1) a vic-
tim (2) a whistleblower (3) a person with local power, and (4) a person 
with central or external power. The actions and information flows 
     |  3THOMAS
are that (a) the person with local power perpetrates (or endorses, 
perhaps by inaction) a detriment on the victim; (b) information about 
the detriment is observed by the whistleblower; (c) information 
about the detriment is communicated by the whistleblower to the 
person with central or external power. This configuration of actors 
(in capitals) and actions or information flows (in lower case) is shown 
in Figure 1.
In a general conceptualization of whistleblowing such as Figure 1, 
it is not possible to use more specific terms for the person with local 
power and the person with central or external power, because each 
may encompass many types. Depending on the factual matrix, the 
person with local power could be the whistleblower's direct man-
ager in an employment relationship, or a more senior manager, or 
someone who is able to exert some influence over the whistleblower 
and others but without an employment relationship, and so forth. 
Similarly, the person with central or external power could be any of 
a more senior manager, a nonexecutive director, a regulator, a politi-
cian, or a journalist, and so forth.
Figure 1 also shows four characteristic features:
1. third-party detriment: the whistleblower observes a detriment 
affecting someone else, which occurs under the aegis of some 
local power;
2. local subversion: the whistleblower challenges the authority of a 
person with local power;
3. appeal to central or external power: the whistleblower appeals 
to a person with higher power, either inside or outside the 
organization;
4. reasonable expectation of concern: the whistleblower reasonably 
expects that the particular person chosen will be concerned by 
the actions of the local power, and take action to correct them.
I now discuss each of these characteristic features in turn.
2.1 | Essential features of whistleblowing
1. Third-party detriment
A whistleblowing disclosure always concerns detriment to a 
victim or potential victim other than the whistleblower. The 
detriment is predominantly third-party, but it need not be 
exclusively third-party; whistleblowers may become aware of 
third-party detriment only because they are to some degree 
affected themselves. Detriment is not confined to actual harm, 
it also encompasses risk of harm, where the local action (or 
inaction) criticized contributes to that risk. In Figure 1 the 
third-party victim is shown as having no ties to the other 
actors except for the (negative) “detriment” relationship with 
the local power. But it is also possible that the victim may 
have preexisting ties which influence whistleblowing and the 
response to it: for example, the victim might be a friend or 
family member of the whistleblower, or of the person to whom 
the whistle is blown.
In this model, the origin and motivation of whistleblowing claims 
is the observation of third-party detriment. More usually, terms 
such as “illegality,” “wrongdoing,” or “immoral act” are used to 
describe the origin and motivation of whistleblowing claims; 
the summary table of common whistleblowing definitions in 
Jubb (1999) includes all of these terms. An advantage of “third-
party detriment” is that it is less subjective, and so potentially 
amenable to agreement in a larger number of cases. Different 
observers can agree that an action gives rise to third-party 
detriment, and hence that a person who makes disclosures 
about it is a whistleblower, while possibly disagreeing about 
the separate issue of whether the action is actually right or 
wrong. As an example to illustrate this separation, suppose a 
university admissions officer reveals to a newspaper that the 
children of major donors are admitted despite falling below 
the normally required grades. We may disagree on whether 
this practice is right or wrong on its overall merits; “legacy 
admissions” are a common occurrence at elite U.S. universities, 
for which various rationalizations can be offered (e.g., perhaps 
the benefits to the institution and all its students from dona-
tions outweigh the detriment to the non-legacy applicants who 
are displaced). But because there is (1) third-party detriment 
F I G U R E  1   A network model of whistleblowing (ACTORS, 
features)
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(i.e., to the excluded non-legacy applicants) (2) local subversion 
(3) appeal to a person with external power by a person who 
has (4) a reasonable expectation of concern, we should be able 
to agree that the official is a whistleblower, irrespective of 
our differing views on the overall merits of legacy admissions.
2. Local subversion
All whistleblowing involves an element of local subversion, that 
is, criticism of actions (or inactions) by a person superior to 
the whistleblower in a local hierarchy. Either the superior is 
the perpetrator of the third-party detriment, or the superior 
is at least complicit in the third-party detriment (perhaps be-
cause the whistleblowers’ peers are the perpetrators, and the 
superior who could intervene does not do so). The element 
of local subversion is the main reason why whistleblowing is 
difficult, and why it may need special protection under law.
It is also the feature that distinguishes whistleblowing from 
reporting on misconduct by subordinates, and informing or 
snitching on misconduct by peers.
A more expansive alternative would be to say that whistleblowing 
need not involve local subversion, but must involve criticism of 
official acts, that is acts done pursuant to some local power 
vested in the person criticized. Using this concept, whistleblowing 
might encompass criticism directed at peers or subordinates 
exercising official power. However, criticism of subordinates 
(certainly) and peers (probably) represent the routine oper-
ation of a local power structure; such actions do not need 
the additional legitimacy conferred by a distinctive label. In 
my view it is better to reserve the “whistleblowing” label for 
actions which do involve local subversion, and hence need the 
additional legitimacy of a distinctive label.
3. Appeal to person with central or external power
Whistleblowing's attempted local subversion always relies on 
disclosure to a person with central or external power. I include 
persons internal or external to the organization, because most 
whistleblowers who use external channels have first tried in-
ternal channels, and the basic process of whistleblowing tends 
to be similar in either case. This feature of appeal to a person 
with central or external power highlights how whistleblowing 
attempts local subversion. Local subversion as a response to 
wrongdoing could proceed in other ways—by overt defiance 
of orders, covert “slow walking” of orders, sabotage, or strike 
action—but these are not the ways of whistleblowing.
4. Reasonable expectation of concern
Whistleblowers have a reasonable expectation that the person to 
whom they choose to report will be concerned by their disclo-
sures. By “reasonable” I mean only that the whistleblower's sub-
jective expectation is not wholly whimsical; I do not mean that all 
(or even most) observers must necessarily agree with the expec-
tation. The reasonable expectation of concern substantiates the 
possibility of whistleblowing, and guides the choice of to whom 
to do it. The expectation may often not be fulfilled: empirical 
studies suggest that many whistleblowers make more than one 
attempt to blow the whistle internally before going external (e.g., 
Miceli, Near, & Dworkin, 2008), so that whistleblowing becomes 
a process rather than an event (Vandekerckhove & Phillips, 2017). 
However, a reasonable expectation that the person approached 
at each iteration will be concerned by the disclosure seems an es-
sential feature; without such an expectation, it is hard to rational-
ize a putative whistleblower approaching a particular person at 
all. And where the whistleblower does go on to approach further 
persons, this can be understood as a response to the expectation 
of concern from the previous person not being fulfilled.
In my view, all four of the features discussed above—third-party 
detriment, local subversion, appeal to a person with central or exter-
nal power, and subjective expectation of concern—need to be pres-
ent for a disclosure to be characterized as whistleblowing. Where 
any of these features is missing, the following descriptions seem 
more apt:
• No third-party detriment: complaint or grievance
• No local subversion: reporting (on subordinates); informing or 
snitching (on peers)
• No appeal to a person with central or external power: treason or es-
pionage (if disclosure made privately to an adversary); gossip (if 
disclosure made privately to peers)
• No reasonable expectation of concern: misdirection (if no reason-
able expectation of concern from specific person approached); or 
trivia (if no reasonable expectation of concern from anyone).
Figure 2 illustrates, analogously to Figure 1, the configuration 
of power relations involved in complaints or grievances concerning 
one's own interests, reporting on misconduct by subordinates, and 
snitching on misconduct by peers. I omit the cases where disclosures 
are made only privately to a rival (treason) or privately to peers (gos-
sip), but these are also easy to draw, and again it is the configuration 
of power relations that distinguishes them from whistleblowing.
Note that the distinctions highlighted in Figure 2 are not nec-
essarily deprecatory of complaining, reporting and snitching. 
Complaining about a matter affecting one's own interests may be 
wholly justified; but it is not the same thing as whistleblowing, and 
characterizing it as such can lead to absurd results. This mistake 
was made in the drafting of the U.K.’s Public Interest Disclosure Act 
1998 as originally enacted, whereby “whistleblowing” protections 
were extended to employees making complaints relating solely to 
their own employment terms, such as disputes about the calcula-
tion of personal bonuses in banking.2 Reporting on misconduct by 
subordinates represents the normal operations of local power; such 
actions are routine and not locally subversive, and so do not need 
legitimization by the distinctive “whistleblower” label. Snitching on 
peers may often be a morally justified choice, on either consequen-
tialist or deontological grounds, and sometimes a moral imperative. 
But there exists a strong and widespread intuition that snitching has 
different moral valence to whistleblowing, and the feature of local 
subversion pinpoints the reason why: whistleblowers challenge local 
power, but snitches ingratiate themselves with local power. Note 
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that is true even for snitches who are motivated entirely by con-
cern for third-party victims, and do not actively desire to ingratiate 
themselves with local power: the difference between snitching and 
whistleblowing arises principally from the different configuration of 
power relations, not from the motive.
The extended example in the next section illustrates the dif-
ferences between this article's concept of whistleblowing and 
proximate concepts such as complaining, snitching, treason, and mis-
directed communication. Appendix compares this article's concept 
of whistleblowing with various definitions in previous literature as 
summarized by Jubb (1999).
2.2 | Example
Bob is an aviation maintenance engineer who supervises a team of 
technicians carrying out safety checks on passenger aircraft. Bob's 
direct manager instructs him to make false reports to an aviation 
safety regulator confirming that particular checks have been carried 
out. Bob reports this maintenance fraud to a more senior manager.
There is third-party detriment (potential harm to the passengers 
and crew), local subversion (of the direct manager's authority), appeal 
to a person with central or external power (the more senior manager), 
and reasonable expectation of concern (from the senior manager 
concerning the maintenance fraud). All four of the characteristic 
features of whistleblowing are present, so Bob is clearly a whis-
tleblower. But the absence of any of the characteristic features will 
turn Bob into something else, as illustrated by the following modifi-
cations to the facts.
Suppose first that the maintenance checks are carried out, but 
Bob is not paid a bonus he was promised by his direct manager. Bob 
reports the broken promise to a more senior manager. Because there 
is no third-party detriment, this is not whistleblowing; it is better 
characterized as an employment complaint or grievance.
Alternatively, suppose that no instruction to make false reports 
is issued, but Bob notices that subordinates or peers are falsifying 
reports. He informs his direct manager. Because there is no local 
subversion, this is not whistleblowing; it is better characterized as ei-
ther reporting (on subordinates) or snitching (on peers). In this case, 
reporting or snitching appears to be an admirable action, indeed 
probably a morally obligatory one. But because Bob can reasonably 
expect to be supported by his direct manager, his obeisance to local 
power does not need legitimization by the “whistleblower” label. If 
however his direct manager's response is dismissive or ineffectual, 
and Bob then reports this to a more senior manager, then he will be 
a whistleblower.
Alternatively, suppose that Bob communicates information about 
the practice of false maintenance reporting to his previous manager at 
F I G U R E  2   Complaining, reporting, and 
snitching (X represents locus of alleged 
misconduct)
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a rival airline. Because there is no appeal to a person with central or ex-
ternal power over the action complained of, this is not whistleblowing. 
The report is made to a rival, so it is better characterized as treason or 
espionage (or in more anodyne language, as a breach of confidence).
As a final alternative, suppose that Bob makes a report to an avi-
ation safety regulator, but his criticism is that the provision for future 
maintenance in the airline's accounts is overstated, so that the com-
pany is currently paying less tax than it would otherwise pay. To a 
safety regulator, this criticism is of no interest: there is no reasonable 
expectation of concern from a safety regulator regarding the detail 
of accounting policies. Bob has misdirected his communication; if he 
goes no further, he will not be recognized as a whistleblower (or at 
least, not an effective one). If however Bob takes this criticism to the 
tax authorities or an accounting regulator, then there will be a rea-
sonable expectation of concern, and so Bob will be a whistleblower. 
(It is possible that the safety regulator might point Bob in this direc-
tion, but this would be akin to a friend of Bob or a helpful stranger 
doing so; it has nothing to do with the safety regulator's functions 
and powers, and hence does not substantiate a reasonable expec-
tation of concern.)
2.3 | Incidental but inessential features of 
whistleblowing
It is also useful to highlight certain features which are commonly as-
sociated with whistleblowing, but which are not part of the model 
above, because they are not essential features.
2.3.1 | Personal identification
Anonymity may protect a whistleblower from reprisals; it may 
also reduce effectiveness, because less credence may be given to 
anonymous reports, and they may be more difficult to investigate. 
Whistleblowers with different preferences and facing different ad-
versaries make this trade-off in different ways: some embrace (or 
perhaps preempt the inevitability of) personal identification (e.g., 
Edward Snowden); others reduce the costs of whistleblowing by per-
manently obscuring their identity (e.g., users of online dropboxes). It 
does not matter; any position on the spectrum of identifiability is 
consistent with whistleblowing.
2.3.2 | Altruistic motivation
The essential feature of third-party detriment implies that a whistle-
blower will typically have at least some element of altruistic concern. 
But disclosures promoted by other motivations—financial reward, 
tactical advantage (say obstructing one's own dismissal), or personal 
animus against local power—can have all four of the characteristic 
features of whistleblowing. Whistleblowing is typically pro-social in 
effect, but it need not be altruistic in intent.
2.3.3 | Lawfulness (procedural correctness)
Whistleblowing laws often specify procedural requirements which 
whistleblowers must satisfy to gain some protection from reprisals. 
Examples include requirements to first use “official channels” such as 
whistleblowing hotlines, requirements for internal disclosure before ex-
ternal disclosure; and sometimes exclusions of whistleblowing for finan-
cial gain. It may be tactically advantageous for a whistleblower to comply 
with such requirements, but it is not essential to do so. Whistleblowing 
need not be a lawful act, and the third-party detriment complained of 
need not be unlawful. Indeed, the feature of local subversion empha-
sizes that whistleblowing will usually be at least “locally unlawful” (in the 
sense that it challenges a person with local power); it may also be “glob-
ally unlawful” in relation to some law of the jurisdiction. But if the four 
essential features of whistleblowing are evident, unlawfulness does not 
detract from the individual's status as a whistleblower.
I stress the view that personal identification, altruism, and lawful-
ness are only incidental features because some authors in contrast 
advocate these are all necessary features. For example, Sagar, 2013, 
pp. 127–139) asserts that to qualify as whistleblowers, individuals 
must reveal their true identities; that their motives must be appraised 
as altruistic; that they must attempt to report through “official chan-
nels” before any alternative form of disclosure; and that even the re-
porting of unlawful acts may not qualify as whistleblowing, if the acts 
do not also meet a higher threshold of “genuine abuse of authority.” 
This seems to me a narrow interpretation of whistleblowing, unduly 
“restrictive and establishmentarian” (Shafer, 2014, p. 140).
3  | CHAR AC TERIZING NET WORK 
STRUC TURE
While the above four-actor model clarifies the essence of whistle-
blowing, and in particular its locally subversive nature, the interac-
tions of the actors highlighted in that model do not occur in isolation: 
the whistleblower, person with local power, and person with central 
power are all embedded in a hierarchy. The incidence and patterns 
of whistleblowing may be sensitive to the topology of the hierarchy. 
Figure 3 shows two simple examples of hierarchies, which I shall use 
to illustrate concepts which can be applied in more complex and re-
alistic hierarchies.
In Figure 3a, each node represents one individual (one actor) in 
the organization. The hierarchy shown has four levels from level 4 
(actors who have nobody reporting to them) to level 1 (the highest au-
thority in the organization). Lines between actors at different levels 
are connections or “ties.” The presence of a tie between two actors 
represents regular communication between them. The ties shown are 
“vertical” in the sense that they all represent bilateral hierarchical re-
lations, where orders flow downward, and reports flow upward. The 
form of hierarchy represented in Figure 3a is equivalent to a military 
chain of command: that is, all actors give orders only to the subset 
of actors assigned to them in the next level down the hierarchy, and 
make reports to a single superior in the next level up the hierarchy. 
     |  7THOMAS
Individuals may also interact with peers at the same level, but these 
ties are approximately neutral in terms of power, and are therefore, 
omitted in the representation of a military chain of command.3
Figure 3b shows a similar hierarchy, except that there are some 
additional ties represented by curved lines. The curved ties indicate 
that some communications regularly “skip” some levels in the hier-
archy. These “level-skipping” ties need not be of the same nature or 
strength as the hierarchical ties between immediately adjacent lev-
els; they could instead represent different types of relationship such 
as kinship or friendship, or common membership of a social group 
outside the organization.
How can we characterize the two hierarchies in Figure 3 and the 
differences between them? Helpful concepts for the whole hierar-
chy are the range and strictness. Helpful concepts for individual ac-
tors are degree, span of control, and centrality.
3.1 | Range
The range of a hierarchy is the number of incremental steps in au-
thority as one moves from the lowest to the highest levels. The hi-
erarchies in Figure 3 each have a range of three. The range between 
F I G U R E  3   Strict and less strict 
hierarchies
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two actors is the number of increments in authority from the lower 
to the higher. The range between each of actors 3a to 3d and actor 
1 in Figure 3 is two.4
3.2 | Strictness
The strictness of a hierarchy refers to the absence of communications 
(orders downward or reports upward) which skip one or more hier-
archical levels. In Figure 3, an index of the strictness of the hierar-
chy can be calculated by counting the curved “level-skipping” ties, 
dividing by the total of all possible “level-skipping” ties, and taking 
the complement of the result (i.e., one minus the result). In each of 
Figure 2a,b, there are 10 possible “level-skipping” ties.5 Thus, the hi-
erarchy in Figure 3a has a strictness of 1–0/10 = 1 (a military chain of 
command); the hierarchy in Figure 3b has a strictness of 1–3/10 = 0.7; 
a hierarchy where all the possible “level-skipping” relationships are 
present has a strictness of zero (a maximally flexible hierarchy). A 
strictness of zero does not mean anarchy. With strictness of zero, 
orders still flow downward, but an actor can give orders to any lower 
level in his own branch of the hierarchy, and make reports upward to 
any higher level in the same branch.
3.3 | Degree
The degree of an individual actor is the number of connections he has 
to other actors. In unstructured networks, high degree is reliably as-
sociated with high power. In a hierarchy, the formal structure of the 
hierarchy means that degree is not an absolute measure of power; 
but for actors of equivalent hierarchical status, it is likely to be a 
good guide. In Figure 3a, of the four actors at the same Level 3 of the 
hierarchy, actor 3b with degree 3 will tend to have more power than 
actor 3a with degree 2, who will have more power than actors 3c and 
3d each with degree 1.
3.4 | Span of control
The span of control of an actor refers to the number of direct reports, 
that is, subordinates who are “one step down” in the same branch 
of the hierarchy. Note that span of control need not necessarily de-
crease as one moves down a hierarchy (and may even increase over 
some ranges—a chief executive might have only say 10 managers as 
direct reports, but one of those might have 15 of her own direct 
reports). In Figure 3a, actors 1, 2a, 2b, and 3b all have two direct 
reports, and so all have the same span of control of two.
3.5 | Centrality
In a hierarchy, an actor has high centrality if he can command a large 
number of actors at lower levels in the same branch of the hierarchy. 
This excludes actors who are at lower levels in a different branch of 
the hierarchy, such that the original actor has no “line of authority” 
to issue an order to them. Thus, in Figure 3a, actor 1 has the highest 
centrality. Actors 3a and 3b, although both at the same level of the 
hierarchy, differ in centrality: 3b has higher centrality by virtue of 
having authority over two rather than one actors.
More subtly, centrality also depends on whether an individual has 
any ties to persons who are themselves powerful. In Figure 3a, actor 4a 
has no hierarchical power over any other actor; but in Figure 3b, he 
has acquired a level-skipping tie directly to actor 1. Despite his lack 
of hierarchical power, actor 4a then has some centrality (and hence 
power) by virtue of his direct tie to a powerful person. The idea that 
an actor has high centrality if he is “well connected to the well-con-
nected” can be quantified by the mathematical concept of eigen-
vector centrality. Another example gives the intuition: eigenvector 
centrality is the basis of the Google PageRank algorithm, which prior-
itizes pages which are well connected to other well-connected pages.
4  | HOW NET WORK STRUC TURE AFFEC TS 
ON WHISTLEBLOWING
Using the concepts from Section 3, I now make some observations 
about how whistleblowing works and its prospects of success under 
different configurations of hierarchy.
4.1 | Whistleblowing reduces local power, and 
increases central or external power
Whistleblowing is typically perceived as a democratizing phe-
nomenon which gives voice to the concerns of subordinates and 
holds power to account (e.g., Burke & Cooper, 2013; Greenberg & 
Edwards, 2009; Mannion & Davies, 2015). This is true at a local level, 
and is reflected in one of the characteristic features of whistleblow-
ing, local subversion. But at a global level, another characteristic fea-
ture of whistleblowing is appeal to a person with central or external 
power. Whistleblowing gives persons with central or external power 
new information, and discretion about what to do on the basis of that 
information: punish the person with local power, punish the whistle-
blower, or just sit on the information and do nothing. Whistleblowing 
reduces local power, and increases central or external power.
This increase in central or external power is an often ne-
glected and potentially troubling consequence of whistleblowing. 
Whistleblowing is good at exposing persons with local power who 
deviate from centrally determined policies; but what if the central 
policies are themselves malign? Might promotion of whistleblow-
ing sometimes merely increase the effectiveness of malign central 
policies? This paradoxical possibility suggests that when assessing 
the likely beneficence of legislative or other efforts to promote 
whistleblowing, we should be cautious where power is concentrated, 
and optimistic where power is distributed. Concern about increased 
concentration of power is also an argument for wide and permissive 
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interpretations of whistleblowing, which legitimize whistleblowing 
to a range of persons, external as well as internal to an organization.
For a vivid illustration of the potentially malign effect of whis-
tleblowing under highly centralized governance, think about Jewish 
families struggling to flee German-occupied territories in the late 
1930s. Histories of this period give many accounts of corruption 
by junior officials, both of Germany and of occupied nations, in the 
issue of false identities, visas, and other documents to refugees (e.g. 
Levine, 2010; Paldiel, 2000; Smith, 1999). The construct of whis-
tleblowing (had it then existed) might have limited this local corrup-
tion, and so given greater efficacy to the prevailing central power; but 
that central power was itself malign. Viewed from today, the optimal 
amount of corruption in the issue of travel documents in Germany 
circa 1938 was fairly high. This is an extreme example, but in weaker 
form the point is quite general: the optimal amount of local corruption 
in any highly centralized system of governance is unlikely to be zero.
For a more contemporary illustration, consider the reporting 
requirements of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and 
Development OECD) for automatic exchange of information on bank 
accounts from financial institutions to the national authorities of the 
account holder. The intent of these reporting requirements appears 
to be to institutionalize a form (mandatory) reporting on tax evasion. 
But the actual effect of the requirements encompasses the auto-
matic supply of information to authoritarian regimes on any citizens 
who hold foreign bank accounts and foreign assets. These assets 
may often be held principally as a form of insurance against future 
victimization by the regime rather than for any tax avoidance motive. 
Privacy from government, including financial privacy, can be vital for 
those who live under capricious regimes, or at high risk of kidnapping 
or extortion. In this context, the provocative headline of the Foglia 
(2019) critique of the OECD requirements may well be accurate: 
“Western transparency is fueling Chinese repression.”
Another vignette which can be understood through the fram-
ing that whistleblowing increases central power is given by Qin, 
Stromberg, and Wu (2017), who note that in China, the central gov-
ernment is quite tolerant of even vituperative criticisms of individual 
local officials on social media. Superficially, this may seem surprising 
in the context of pervasive censorship and central control of media 
in China. But it can be understood by noting that an unusually large 
volume of whistleblowing complaints about a particular local offi-
cial is a low-cost monitoring mechanism for central power to identify 
local deviations from central policies, and so allowing and even en-
couraging this form of whistleblowing can reinforce central power.
Another way of describing the power centralization that whis-
tleblowing can bring about is to say that whistleblowing tends to in-
crease the effectiveness of law enforcement (where “law enforcement” 
is broadly construed so as to include the implementation of local or-
ganizational rules as the context requires). This suggests that efforts 
to facilitate or encourage whistleblowing (e.g., laws, hotlines, and 
publicity campaigns) should be preferentially directed to hierarchical 
ranges where more effective law enforcement is unambiguously de-
sirable. In my view it is generally not desirable for law enforcement— 
whether of organizational rules or statutory laws—to be fully 
effective at all levels of all hierarchies, because innovation and prog-
ress often depend on some degree of rule-breaking. I am confident 
that some statutory laws which currently enjoy wide support (in-
cluding from me) will be regarded as misconceived or even barbaric 
in 200 years’ time; my problem is I do not know which current laws 
are misconceived. But social progress clearly depends on being able 
to break bad laws, which would be difficult in a world where all law 
enforcement was fully effective.
Sophisticated whistleblowers can lessen their dependence on the 
discretionary action of any single power by simultaneously approach-
ing more than one. The former National Security Agency contractor 
Edward Snowden appears to have consciously followed this strategy:
Snowden was deliberately juggling the three journal-
ists and their outlets. Each one – Gellman, Poitras, 
and Greenwald – offered a decidedly different pros-
pect. ‘He did not want to be pre-empted’, Gellman 
says, referring to the government’s stopping publi-
cation. ‘That would have been his worst case. This, I 
think, does help explain why he had multiple outlets. 
He didn’t know whether any of us would be there ul-
timately or our news agencies wouldn’t go for it, or 
someone would come and take the documents from 
us, or whatever. And you can see what a meticu-
lous planner he is from everything that is out now’. 
(Burrough et al., 2014).
4.2 | Internal power typically derives from few 
strong ties, external power from many weak ties
Suppose a whistleblower takes an allegation that a middle manager is 
accepting bribes to a corporate director. The power of the director de-
rives from (a) her hierarchical authority over the corrupt middle manager 
and (b) her horizontal ties to peers such as other directors, and her hi-
erarchical tie to the chief executive. Internal power typically derives from 
few strong ties. Now suppose instead that the whistleblower is dissatis-
fied with the director's response, and therefore, takes the allegation of 
bribery to a newspaper. The newspaper has no hierarchical authority 
to countermand the middle manager whom the whistleblower criti-
cizes, and no ties to other persons with power in the organization. But 
it can publish stories about the bribery, which will be read by millions 
of people, including those who may themselves have some power over 
the organization, such as politicians and regulators. The newspaper has 
only weak ties (principally the tie of “readership”), but duplicated over 
millions of people. External power typically derives from many weak ties.
4.3 | Whistleblowing is harder over larger 
ranges of subversion
In Figure 3a, suppose actor 2a inflicts some detriment on a third-
party, and the subordinate actors at levels 3 and 4 observe this. If 
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actors at level 3 blow the whistle to 1, this is their boss once re-
moved; the range of the subversion is 2. But if actors at level 4 blow 
the whistle to 1, this is their boss twice removed; the range of the 
subversion is 3.
A larger range of subversion tends to create difficulties for both 
the whistleblower and the person with central power. For the whis-
tleblower, the report has to be made to a more remote person, whom 
the whistleblower may be unsure how to approach. For that person, 
endorsing the whistleblower's criticism involves subverting a larger 
range of the organizational hierarchy, which may undermine its fu-
ture legitimacy and effectiveness. Greater difficulty for both whis-
tleblower and the person to whom the report is made implies lower 
likelihood of success.
Now suppose instead that the actors at levels 3 and 4 do not 
expect that actor 1 would be concerned by the level 2 actor's be-
havior. To be successful, any whistleblowing complaint must then 
be made to an external power, and must result in the (expected) 
views of actor 1 being over-ruled; that is, the entire organizational 
hierarchy must be subverted. The range of subversion for external 
whistleblowing is usually larger than with internal whistleblowing. 
Note that this does not mean that external whistleblowing is a bad 
strategic choice. Rather it means that matters which demand exter-
nal whistleblowing—those for which internal whistleblowing has no 
prospect of success, because there is no reasonable expectation 
of concern at any level within the internal hierarchy—are more dif-
ficult for whistleblowers than those for which such an expectation 
exists.
4.4 | Whistleblowing is harder in stricter hierarchies
Whistleblowing involves communication via a tie which skips at 
least one level in the hierarchy. Where a hierarchy has low strict-
ness (i.e., many “level-skipping” ties exist), a potential whistle-
blower is more likely already to have a tie to a suitable person to 
whom the whistle can be blown. In Figure 3b, actor 4a already 
has a tie with actor 1; so if when he wants to blow the whistle on 
actor 2a, the preexisting relationship may help to offset the dif-
ficulty which would otherwise arise from the large range of sub-
version. Even if 4a did not already have a relationship with actor 
1, initiating it afresh is likely to be easier in an organization where 
the hierarchy has low strictness, so that level-skipping ties are 
commonplace.
4.5 | Lower degree may facilitate external 
whistleblowing
Most actors in Figure 3b have ties to at least two other actors. The 
exceptions are actors 4b and 4c, who have ties only to their immedi-
ate superiors. In network terms, actors 4b and 4c have “low degree” 
(in their case, a degree of one). Low degree may increase an actor's 
propensity to blow the whistle to an external rather than central 
power, for three reasons. First, lower degree suggests a lack of the 
preexisting level-skipping ties which could facilitate internal whistle-
blowing. Second, lower degree may reduce the perceived social cost 
(e.g., possible ostracism from colleagues) of external whistleblowing. 
Third, lower degree suggests a lower effect of organizational “group-
think” in inhibiting whistleblowing.
It follows that an organization which wishes to keep secrets from 
outsiders should ensure that as far as possible, actors with low de-
gree do not have access to those secrets. Large databases held in 
electronic form tend to have the opposite effect: either accidentally 
or by design, they make secrets accessible and portable to many 
actors, including those of low degree. This technological change in 
accessibility and portability of secrets for actors of low degree may 
be a more important explanation for the spate of mass disclosures in 
recent years (e.g., Wikileaks, Luxleaks, Panama Papers, and so forth) 
than any change in the underlying beliefs or motivations of actors 
of low degree. Affordances shape actions; technology is often up-
stream of politics.
4.6 | Persons with a larger span of control are more 
likely to become the target of whistleblowing claims
“Span of control” refers to the number of actors which an actor in 
a position of local power has reporting directly to her. In Figure 3a, 
actors 1, 2a, 2b, and 3b all have a span of control of two, and actor 
3a has a span of control of one. Where a person has a larger span of 
control, this means more subordinates with knowledge of any third-
party detriment imposed by local power, and potentially differing 
judgments of propriety. A larger number of subordinates increases 
the chance that at least one will decide to blow the whistle.
4.7 | Focus whistleblowing promotion on enclaves
An enclave (also known as a clique) is a group of actors who have 
many and strong ties within the group, but few and weak ties out-
side the group. Enclaves tend to be vulnerable to corruption, be-
cause the density of in-group ties facilitates cooperation to develop 
distinctive norms, while the scarcity of out-group ties limits oppor-
tunities for monitoring by outsiders or whistleblowing to outsiders 
(Ferrali, 2018). Networks with a higher incidence of enclaves, that is, 
higher modularity (Newman, 2006), may tend to have a higher over-
all incidence of corruption. This suggests that promotion of whistle-
blowing (and other anti-corruption mechanisms such as auditing) 
should be preferentially directed at networks with high modularity, 
and particularly at enclaves within them.
4.8 | “Bell-ringers” and unstructured networks
The discussion above focuses on hierarchies, which are a particular 
type of network where structure has both planned and emergent 
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aspects, and whistleblowing is difficult primarily because it in-
volves subverting the planned design over at least part of its range. 
This framing has been chosen because the term “whistleblower” 
typically describes a person embedded in a hierarchy. But some-
times the term is also used to encompass persons who observe 
and report events from outside an organization, the so-called “bell-
ringers” (Miceli, Dreyfus, & Near, 2014). For persons outside an 
organization, the concept of a hierarchy is less relevant; instead, 
the bell-ringer, local power, and central power can be thought of 
as embedded in an unstructured network where power is a wholly 
emergent property.
To illustrate, suppose the putative bell-ringer receives a mis- 
addressed e-mail which contains a schedule detailing the award of 
public contracts in exchange for bribes paid to a politician. The bell-
ringer is situated an unstructured network comprising his own ties, 
those of the politician, and those of any person to whom he might 
blow the whistle. The prospects for successful whistleblowing de-
pend on the network degree and centrality of each of the parties 
(i.e., how many ties and to whom). It helps if the bell-ringer chooses 
a journalist at a newspaper with a large number of readers (many 
weak ties), or if the bell-ringer is a personal friend of the editor (a 
single strong tie). On the contrary, if the politician has strong ties, or 
many ties—if the politician is a friend of the editor, or can mobilize 
many supporters to defend the criticized actions—then that will tend 
to reduce the prospect of successful whistleblowing. To put this an-
other way: the outcome of whistleblowing is determined partly by 
social capital, and in the absence of hierarchy, network degree and 
centrality may be good measures of social capital.
Unstructured networks often have the “scale-free” property 
(e.g., Barabási & Bonabeau, 2003) whereby a very few nodes ac-
crue a very large number of ties, so that high power accrues to these 
nodes despite the absence of hierarchical design. I noted earlier that 
in a hierarchy, whistleblowing tends to increase central power but 
reduce local power. The same is probably true in an unstructured 
network: a higher incidence of whistleblowing reduces the scope 
for unpublicized malfeasance at nodes of relatively low degree, 
but increases the power of the more central nodes, to whom whis-
tleblowers choose to make reports precisely because these nodes 
are already influential (the so-called “preferential attachment” in 
Barabási & Albert, 1999). This naturally emergent centralization may 
be an argument against giving particular officials or types of pub-
lications special legal privileges in relation to whistleblowing, and 
in favor of broad and permissive cultural and legal interpretations 
which legitimize whistleblowing to a wide range of external powers, 
not just those already endowed with high centrality.
5  | LIMITATIONS OF THE NET WORK 
PERSPEC TIVE
The network perspective characterizes the relations between 
actors without reference to a time dimension, and so it cannot 
explicitly represent whistleblowing as a protracted process (e.g. 
Vandekerckhove & Phillips, 2017). However, a process can be con-
ceived as a sequence of instances of (timeless) network relations. 
Specifically, when the whistleblower's reasonable expectation of 
concern from the person approached is unfulfilled (i.e., unsuccess-
ful whistleblowing), and the whistleblower looks for a new person 
for whom a reasonable expectation of concern exists, this can be 
thought of as a new instance of the link from whistleblower to per-
son with central or external power. The success or failure of whistle-
blowing in this new instance is then contingent on the new network 
properties (the centrality of the person to whom the new report is 
made, and the range of subversion involved).
In the network perspective, the distance between two actors is 
conceived as the number of links along the shortest path between 
them (called the “range” or “range of subversion” in the hierarchical 
context in this paper). Network constructs cannot represent the idea 
that the difference in power between two actors (e.g., between a 
person and their immediate boss) may be perceived as large or small, 
independent of the network positions of the two actors. Perceptions 
of power differences and the extent to which those differences 
should be accepted are characteristically larger in some cultures than 
in others, a phenomenon captured by the Power Distance dimension 
in Hofstede's theory of cultural dimensions (Hofstede, 1980). The 
Power Distance Index tends to be higher for East European, Latin, 
Asian, and African countries, and lower for Germanic and English-
speaking Western countries (Hofstede, 2011). Intuitively, Power 
Distance seems likely to be negatively associated with probability 
of whistleblowing, and this has tended to be confirmed in empirical 
studies.6 Differences between cultures in Power Distance suggest 
a need for caution in when applying the network perspective in dif-
ferent cultures. For example, whistleblowing with a given range of 
subversion, say three (that is, reporting to the boss of one's boss's 
boss) may be perceived differently in cultures with lower and higher 
Power Distance.
6  | DISCUSSION
The main contribution of this article is to present a network per-
spective on whistleblowing. It clarifies the nature of whistleblowing 
by reference to the network relations between four actors (victim, 
whistleblower, a person with local power, and a person with central 
or external power), and four characteristic features of whistleblow-
ing (third-party detriment, local subversion, appeal to central or ex-
ternal power, and expectation of concern).
The feature of local subversion highlights the fundamental dif-
ference between whistleblowing and adjacent phenomena such as 
complaints about one's own treatment, reporting on subordinates, 
or snitching on peers. This succinctly explains why whistleblow-
ers encounter controversy and resistance, and why they are often 
badly treated even when they are clearly right. The schematic rep-
resentation in Figure 1 emphasizes the locally subversive nature of 
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whistleblowing, and Figure 2 succinctly distinguishes it from the ad-
jacent phenomena. These distinctions are in my view more crisply 
explained by the network perspective than by the other perspec-
tives that I summarized at the start of this article.
The feature of appeal to a person with central or external power 
highlights that contrary to the common perception of a democra-
tizing phenomenon, whistleblowing can often redistribute discre-
tion away from a person with local power who is criticized toward a 
person with more central or external power. The increase in central 
power consequent on whistleblowing may be troubling where there 
is a possibility that central power is itself malign: whistleblowing 
might then just increase the effectiveness of malign policies. This 
suggests a need for caution about legislative or other efforts to pro-
mote whistleblowing in contexts where governance is already highly 
centralized.
The actors in an organization will of course have idiosyncratic 
personal characteristics and beliefs which affect their actions, and 
so the focus in this article on the network relations between them 
should not be expected to fully explain whistleblowing phenomena. 
The network perspective is a complement rather than a substitute 
for the survey, psychological, legal, and ethical perspectives, and 
each approach addresses questions which the others cannot answer. 
For example, the network perspective cannot explain which of two 
actors with equivalent knowledge and similar network positions but 
different personality characteristics is more likely to become a whis-
tleblower. Conversely, the psychological perspective cannot explain 
which of two actors with equivalent knowledge and similar personal-
ities but different network positions is more likely to become a whis-
tleblower. Understanding is best advanced by combining multiple 
perspectives.
7  | CONCLUSION
In this article I presented a network perspective on whistleblow-
ing. I described how whistleblowing affects, and is affected by, the 
preexisting distribution of power inside and outside an organization, 
where power is conceptualized as deriving from the network posi-
tions of the key actors. The focus on network positions facilitated 
crisp distinctions between whistleblowing and the adjacent phe-
nomena of complaining about one's own interests, reporting on sub-
ordinates, and snitching on peers.
The network perspective suggests many possible research agen-
das. For example, I have theorized that whistleblowing should be 
more straightforward in hierarchies with low strictness, and where 
the range of required subversion is small. While this seems plausi-
ble, the incidence and outcomes of whistleblowing in “strict” versus 
“loose” hierarchies, and over small versus large hierarchical ranges, 
could be investigated empirically. I have also theorized that actors 
of low degree are more likely to become external whistleblowers; 
if this is correct, it should be possible to verify that external whis-
tleblowers are typically less connected to their peers than those 
peers are among themselves. Finally, I have suggested that persons 
with a larger span of control (that is a larger number of persons re-
porting directly to them) are more likely to become the target of 
whistleblowing claims; in organizations where managers of equiv-
alent seniority have differing numbers of direct reports, it may be 
possible to validate this empirically.
CONFLIC T OF INTERE S T
The author declares that he has no conflict of interest.
ORCID
R. Guy Thomas  https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4745-5849 
ENDNOTE S
 1 In more general usage, “power” can refer to the ability to get things 
done acting alone; it need not involve the agency of others. A mathe-
matician has the power to produce proofs; an Olympic weightlifter has 
the power to lift heavy weights. But we are not concerned with such 
solitary powers in this article. 
 2 This rule was established in the 2002 employment tribunal case 
Parkins v. Sodexho Ltd. The rule was reversed by the Enterprise and 
Regulatory Reform Act 2013, which requires a whistleblower to have 
reasonable belief that a disclosure is made “in the public interest” (but 
not excluding cases where the whistleblower's own interests are also 
engaged). The presence of “third-party detriment” (or potential detri-
ment) is similar to “in the public interest,” but in my view more objec-
tively determinable. 
 3 Peer ties are not completely neutral: an individual with many peer ties 
will probably be more powerful than an individual with few peer ties. 
But the vertical ties are more important, so I focus mainly on those. 
 4 Network analysts would typically use the term “distance” instead of 
“range” for the shortest path between two nodes, and “diameter” for 
the shortest distance between the two most distant points in the net-
work; but “range” seems a more descriptive term for a hierarchy. 
 5 Each of the three actors at level 4 has two possible level-skipping ties, 
and each of the four actors at level 3 has one possible level-skipping 
tie. This assumes that level-skipping ties cannot link a lower actor to 
an upper actor who is in a different “chain of command,” for example, 
actor 4a can be linked to 2a, but not to 2b. For some organizations, it 
might be more accurate to negate this assumption. 
 6 Vandekerckhove et al (2014) review 11 empirical studies of the asso-
ciation between Power Distance and probability of whistleblowing. 
Seven found a negative relationship, three no relationship, and one 
a positive relationship (the last related specifically to external rather 
than internal whistleblowing). 
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APPENDIX 
Comparisons with previous authors’ definitions of whistleblowing
A widely cited definition of whistleblowing is that of Near and Miceli 
(1985):
‘the disclosure by organization members (former or cur-
rent) of illegal, immoral or illegitimate practices under the 
control of their employers, to persons or organizations 
that may be able to effect action’.
This definition maps onto the network perspective as follows:
Organization members, employers, persons, or organizations that 
may be able to effect action correspond to three of the four actors: 
whistleblower, local power, central, or external power, respectively. 
Disclosure corresponds to appeal to central or external power. The idea 
of illegal, immoral, or illegitimate practices alludes to the fourth actor, 
the victim, who suffers detriment about which there is a reasonable 
expectation of concern. Note that this definition has no element cor-
responding to the idea of local subversion, and therefore, does not 
highlight the differences between whistleblowing (as I define it), re-
porting on subordinates, and snitching on peers.
Jubb (1999) conveniently summarizes seven definitions of 
whistleblowing given by previous authors. He infers that a defini-
tion of whistleblowing includes six necessary elements: (a) an act of 
disclosure (b) an actor (c) a disclosure subject (d) a target organiza-
tion held responsible (e) a disclosure recipient (f) an outcome, the 
disclosure entering the public domain. These six elements map onto 
the network perspective as follows:
• elements (b), (c), (d), and (e) correspond to the four actors: respec-
tively, the whistleblower, victim, local power, central, or external 
power
• element (d), a target organization held responsible, also encom-
passes reasonable expectation of concern;
• element (a) an act of disclosure corresponds to appeal to central or 
external power;
• element (f) the disclosure entering the public domain, does not 
feature in my definition, which allows that a disclosure might be 
made internally or privately, for example, to a regulator.
Jubb's six elements, and the seven previous definitions of whistle-
blowing which he characterizes by these six elements, do not explic-
itly reference the idea of local subversion. But he does emphasize 
elsewhere in his text that whistleblowing is an act of dissent, and 
that this is the feature which distinguishes whistleblowing from 
other reporting of misconduct.
